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The Effect of Repeal of the Capital Gain 
Preference on Venture-Backed Companies
James R. Hamill and Inder Khurana
The 1986 Tax Reform Act eliminated preferential tax treatment of capital gains. 
Proposals to reinstate the preference suggest that risky new investment will suffer 
without favorable treatment of investment returns. Others have argued that 
capital for risky new ventures is largely supplied by tax-exempt institutions, who 
are expected to be indifferent to the taxation of realized gains. This study 
evaluates the effects of the repeal of preferential capital gains taxation on venture 
backed firms. The results show negative abnormal returns for sample firms 
following the Senate’s vote to repeal the capital gain preference. The returns were 
more negative for firms with a high debt-to-assets ratio, suggesting a more adverse 
effect for firms relying on equity finance for future capital needs. Sample firms 
were expected to be particularly sensitive to the tax change, and the results may 
not be generalizable to other forms of risky investment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) changed the rate structure applicable to 
corporate and noncorporate taxpayers, reducing the maximum marginal tax 
rate and altering the progressivity of the tax system.^ The TRA also eliminated 
the long standing preferential treatment of net capital gains. The effect that 
the elimination of the capital gain preference will have on capital availability 
for risky new ventures has been an issue of recent debate among policy 
makers. In this study, we test the effects of TRA’s repeal of preferential capital 
gain treatment on investors’ willingness to assume risk in Ae context of firms 
backed by venture capital. Specifically, this study measures the effect of repeal 
of the capital gain preference on share prices of venture backed firms and
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evaluates the differential impact across venture backed firms. The results 
suggest that preferential treatm ent of capital gains reduces the required 
risk-adjusted returns of firms that rely on venture capital for growth.
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (RRA’93) increased the maxi­
mum tax rate to 39.6 percent, effective January 1,1993, while maintaining a 
statutory maximum rate of 28 percent for net capital gains. The RRA’93 also 
introduced a 50 percent exclusion for stock that has been held for at least 
five years in qualifying small businesses (capitalization no t in excess of $50 
m illion). The preferential treatm ent of net capital gains for tax years begin­
ning in 1993 is not as favorable as for pre-1987 years, in which all taxpayers 
received a 60 percent exclusion for net capital gains and without the need to 
satisfy a five-year holding period. Proponents of tax-favored treatm ent of 
capital gains were generally unenthused by the RRA’93 changes. Thus, the 
impact of RRA’93 on sample firms is expected to be less than that of TRA 
because not all investment will qualify for the exclusion.
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n . THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: TAXES AND RISK TAKING
Theoretical research examining the effect of the tax structure on the 
demand for risky investment has generated ambiguous predictions, due to 
an inability to specify the appropriate investor utility function. While theory 
predicts that the tax system will effect risky investment behavior, the direction 
is not clear. The absence of a strong theoretical economic foundation 
increases the need for empirical evidence that would be pertinent to re­
searchers and policy makers considering tax-based investment incentives, 
including the reinstatement of a capital gain preference for all forms of 
investment.
Theoretical research examining the effect of the tax stmcture on risk-taking 
behavior has included the effects of three factors: the tax rate (generally 
modelled as a movement from no tax to the introduction of a specified tax); 
the nature of the tax as proportional or progressive in relation to income; 
and whether the investor is permitted full loss offset, limited loss offset, or no 
loss offset from the investment.
Domar and Musgrave (1944) note that the introduction of an income tax 
may affect investment behavior through a change in the ratio of return to 
risk, and through a desire to generate additional income to ofifeet the effects 
of the tax. Mossin (1968) and Stiglitz (1969), using an expected utility model 
and assuming risk-averse investors, show an increase in the tax rate leads the 
investor to substitute risky investment for a risk-free investment in an attempt
to compensate for some of the loss of income caused by the tax. Since wealth 
changes, it is necessary to consider Pratt-Arrow measures of relative and 
absolute risk aversion.^ With full loss offset, risk taking will always increase 
with an increase in a proportional tax. With no loss offset the effects are 
ambiguous with risk taking expected to increase at low tax rates and decrease 
at high rates. Because the current tax law limits the ability to offset losses to 
$3,000 per year, the Mossin and Stiglitz model produces ambiguous predic­
tions of the effects of TRA on risk taking.
FellinghamandW olfson (1978) observe that investors may be risk neutral 
over some relevant range of after-tax wealth, but the institutional friction of 
a tax will lead to induced risk aversion over pre-tax returns. Using this 
framework for consideration of a risk averse (quadratic) utility function, they 
analyze both proportional and progressive rate structures. Taxation affects 
risk taking in two ways. First, it reduces the dispersion of pre-tax returns, 
unambiguously increasing the demand for risky assets (dispersion-reduction 
effect). Second, it reduces the investor’s wealth position (wealth-reduction 
effect). The impact of the wealth reduction effect is ambiguous, dependent 
on local measures of relative and absolute risk aversion. A progressive tax 
system is shown to generate ambiguous predictions for any measures of risk 
aversion. However, ceteris paribus, the demand for a risky asset should decrease 
for an increase in the progressivity of the system.
The theoretical work, to date, has failed to provide clear predictions of 
the effects of the tax structure on investment behavior. In addition to the 
inability to observe investor utility functions, it is not clear whether the tax 
system can be characterized as progressive or proportional, or whether the 
system provides a practical constraint on full loss offset.
Current Policy Debate
Although theory is ambiguous, the effect of preferential capital gain 
taxation on risk-taking behavior has been frequendy debated in the policy 
arena. Bygrane and Timmons (1992, p. 262) state that “within the venture 
capital industry, it is almost universally believed that the federal capital gains 
tax rate is the most im portant influence on the flows of venture capital.” The 
most frequent argum ent against the need for a capital gain preference to 
stimulate risky new investment is that the venture capital industry is domi­
nated by tax-exempt investors that would be indifferent to the taxation of 
investment returns. This has been documented by Poterba (1989) and others 
with respect to outside providers of funds after the early stages of growth of
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a new venture. However, the National Venture Capital Association reports 
that taxable investors provide the mzgotity of early-stage financing, with 
tax-exempt investors coming into the m arket in later stages (Walker 8c 
Bloomfield, 1989). Proponents of the need for tax-favored treatm ent of 
capital gains contend that RRA’93 is not likely to stimulate new risky invest­
m ent because most capital gains are still taxed at a 28 percent rate. Qualifying 
for a 50 percent exclusion requires a five-year holding period and is limited 
to regular corporations with capitalization n o tin  excess of $50 million. Prior 
to 1987, all taxpayers qualified for a 60 percent exclusion for net capital gains 
provided a one-year holding period was satisfied.
With the diverse group of investors providing fimds to risky new ventures, 
it is not clear what the effect of capital gains tax policy will be. There is some 
evidence that changes in capital gains taxes can affect equity values (Amoako- 
Adu, Rashid, 8c Stebbins, 1992), but no direct evidence on the effect on 
venture backed firms. Given the dearth of theoretical and empirical guid­
ance, and the importance of this issue to policy makers, research that 
illuminates the effects of tax law changes on the price of risky investment will 
be an im portant contribution to tax policy literature.
Venture Capital Financing
Start-up firms that are backed by venture financing must generally rely on 
the venture financiers to fund their growth through distinct “rounds” of 
financing (Camp 8c Sexton, 1992). As the firm grows, the entrepreneur trades 
a progressively larger share of the equity of the venture for the fimding 
needed for growth. On average Coopers and Lybrand (1986) foimd that 
entrepreneurs surrendered 37 percent of the equity during the first roxmd 
of financing, and cumulatively 50 percent and 58 percent during the second 
and third rounds, respectively.
In an analysis of the venture-capital market, Sahlman (1990) indicates 
that approximately two-thirds of organized venture capital funds are provided 
by private limited partnerships. The venture investors most commonly ac­
quire convertible preferred stock that is held for an average of 4.9 years. 
Norton and Tenenbaum (1992), in a survey of venture capital firms, show 
that common stock investments are atypical because the venture capitalist 
prefers a priority claim to firm assets. Although a venture capitalist’s preferred 
stock often does not provide for a current dividend, a dividend can be paid 
at the discretion of the Board of Directors, and the venture capitalist typically 
controls the Board. Further, preferred stock dividend payments are typically
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cumulative, providing the investor with a priority claim for unpaid dividends. 
A typical organized venture fund invests in only 12 projects each year selected 
from 1000 proposals.^ Discount rates can be as high as 70 percent for start-up 
stages, and typically range between 25 and 35 percent for initial public 
offerings (Sahlman, 1990).
At the time that a firm is initially taken public, the market is expected to 
price the firm ’s securities on the assumption that required future financing 
will be available at some expected price. Sahlman (1990) indicates that 
venture capitalists exercise control over investments by staging the commit­
m ent of capital, and that “each company begins life knowing that it has only 
enough capital to reach the next stage.” Neeley (1992) documents that 
early-stage firms suffer more from liquidity shortfalls than do established 
firms because of differential access to capital markets. Thus, early-stage firms 
can be expected to be more adversely affected by tax law changes that affect 
the availability of credit. Norton and Tenenbaum ’s (1992) survey data also 
demonstrate that venture capitalists are sensitive to expected tax law changes.
If TRA affected the price of private risky investment, then the market 
would revise its expectations of the cost or availability of future financing in 
the post-TRA era. Presumably, no financing will be available at the price the 
venture backed firm is willing to pay, or financing will be available at a higher 
price than initially expected. Either of these alternatives might also cause the 
firm to restructure its financing plans, which can be costiy.^
Research Hypotheses
litzenberger and Ramaswzimy (1979) empirically find that stocks with 
greater tax exposure tend to sell at lower prices and greater than expected 
pre-tax returns. Higher than expected pre-tax returns are demanded by the 
m arket to offset the greater tax exposure and provide equivalent after-tax 
returns of equally risky stocks with different tax exposures. Thus the pricing 
of initial public offerings (IPO) made by venture backed firms prior to the 
TRA repeal of the capital gain preference is expected to incorporate the cash 
flow consequences of a favorable tax treatm ent for capital gains.
To the extent that elimination of the capital gain preference discouraged 
private risk taking behavior, security returns of venture backed firms should 
be negative at the time of deliberations and public announcements relating 
to the repeal of the preference. Stated in terms of the first research hypothe­
sis:
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H I; Security prices of venture backed firms are reduced following an­
nouncements that increase the probability of repeal of the capital 
gain preference.
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Poterba (1989) reports that in addition to equity finance, venture backed 
firms often use debt and other sources of capital. Based on 1976 data, he finds 
that debt accoimts for 70 percent of the capitalization of start-up enterprises. 
Sahlman (1990) and Neeley (1992) find that venture capitalists typically use 
preferred equity financing. If venture financing is expected to be the source of 
fiiture fiinds, it is expected that venture backed firms must rely more on equity 
rather than other sources of financing for future growth. The decline in stock 
prices at the time a tax law change adversely affects equity finance is expected 
to be a direct fiinction of the capital structure at the time of the change.
Neeley (1992) also finds that the venture capitalist’s preference for equity 
finance is related to the expected future tax rate, suggesting a reluctance to 
offer equity financing when tax changes are detrimental to equity gains. 
Venture firms are then expected to be more adversely affected by the repeal 
of the capital gain preference the higher the ratio of debt to assets. This is 
because firms with a relatively high debt to assets ratio have lower equity 
capitalization and must rely more heavily on future sources of equity finance. 
The capital gain repeal will then force them to seek alternative methods of 
financing or to obtain equity capital at a higher cost, if the cost of equity 
increased post-TRA. Stated in terms of the second research hypothesis;
H2; Ceteris paribus, the security price response of venture backed firms 
following annoxmcements that increase the probability of repeal of the 
capital gain preference will be direcdy related to the debt-assets ratio.
Research Design
This study uses an interrupted time series design in order to study the 
effects of repeal of the capital gain preference on venture-backed firms.
Sample Selection
The study is based upon a sample of 181 venture backed firms that made 
initial public offerings from 1983 to 1985 as part of first round financing. The
Table 1 
Sample Reconciliation
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1983 1984 1985 Total
Initial sample as identified from the Venture Capital Journal 121 53 46 220
Less stock return data unavailable on CRSP tapes 16 3 4 23
105 50 42 197
Less financial statement data unavailable on compustat 4 6 6 16
Final Sample 101 44 36 181
1983-1985 period is selected because we are interested in firms that are in 
the early stages of venture financing and that will be heavily dependent on 
future availability of capital for growth. The time period for the IPO predates 
the legislative discussions of TRA, which occurred throughout the 1986 
calendar year.
The initial sample was selected from the Venture CapitalJournal Firms were 
then deleted based upon availability of financial statement data on Compustat 
tapes and stock return data on the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) daily tapes. Compustat and CRSP have a selection bias in favor of 
larger firms. It was expected that changes in capital gains tax policy would 
have a more detrimental effect on smaller firms, and the use of CRSP and 
Compustat firms would not bias in favor of supporting the research hypothe-
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics on Firm-Characteristics of Final Sample
Standard
N Mean Deviation Median
Net Sales 181 67.80 95.33 28.14
Net Income 181 1.32 7.77 0.95
Total Debt 181 27.17 53.10 9.45
Total Assets 181 60.23 78.09 30.97
Return on Assets 181 -6.90 27.00 2.50
Return on Equity 181 27.30 416.80 4.70
DebtiAsset Ratio 181 0.37 0.23 0.32
Market:Book Ratio 174 1.77 16.99 2.43
Notes: ^Monetary amounts are in millions
A^ll amounts are based on fiscal year 1985 financial statements
ses. O f the 181 firms in the final sample, 101 firms underwent the IPO in 1983, 
44 in 1984, and 36 in 1985. Sample tests were conducted with the fiill sample 
firom 1983 and then the individual firms from 1984 and 1985 to determ ine if 
results could be biased by the large num ber of 1983 firms. Eighty-three 
percent of the final sample firms are listed on NASDAQ. Using two (four)-  
digit SIC codes, 33 (85) industries were represented in the final sample. Table
1 shows a reconciliation of the full sample with the firms included in sample 
tests.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for sample firms.
Selection of Event Dates
Legislative histories. Tax Notes and the BNA Daily Tax Report were used 
to prepare an extensive chronicle of events related to the passage of TRA.® 
Since this study was interested in the effects of the repeal of the capital 
gain preference, event dates were selected to isolate discussions of capital 
gain repeal and to assess dates that would affect the probability of passage 
of the capital gain repeal. This event date selection was designed to 
minimize the confounding effects of the general effect o f TRA on sample 
firms.
We identify four key event periods affecting the probability of repeal of 
the capital gain preference. Each event period is two days in length, covering 
the day of the event and the succeeding trading day. The dates selected are:
1. May 2 and 3, 1986—Senate Finance Committee Chairman Pack- 
wood introduces a reform measure that offers rates of 15 and 27 
percent and the first m ention of repeal of the capital gain prefer­
ence since November 1984 Treasury proposals. The adm inistration 
and some committee members do no t approve of the capital gain 
repeal;
2. May 7 and 8—^Packwood gets approval from the comm ittee for his 
earlier proposal, including repeal of the capital gain preference;
3. May 29 and 30—^Packwood announces that he intends to stand firm 
on capital gains repeal, and 31 Senators support a no amendment 
proposal. Senator Cranston attempts to gather support for retention 
of the capital gain preference; and
4. June 24 and 25—the Senate, by a 97-3 vote, passes a bill that eliminated 
the capital gain preference.
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Methodology
The hypotheses are tested by forming an equally-weighted portfoUo of 
sample firms and estimating the abnormal return of the portfolio during the 
kth event’s announcem ent period. The abnormal return is estimated over 
206 trading days ending October 23,1986, using the following return gener­
ating process.
rt=ao + bormt + ^ZkD kt+et
where n = Return on an equally-weighted portfolio of common stock 
on day t
Tmt = Return on the CRSP value-weighted index on day t.
Dkt = one for the announcem ent period of the Mi event concern­
ing the repeal of the capital gain preference, and zero 
otherwise.
Ct = Residuals for the portfolio on day t.
do = Estimated average intercept.
bo = Estimated average beta for contemporaneous m arket vari­
able.
Zkt = Estimated abnormal portfolio return during event k.
t=  1, 2 , . . .  206 days.
k= 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The advantage of forming a portfolio is that tests of the average market 
reaction are sensitive to both contemporaneous cross-dependencies in the 
error term and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity in those error terms.
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n . RESULTS
Results of the test of a nonzero effect (on average) on the stockholders of 
sample firm s around each event are reported in Table 3. Column three of 
this table shows the average abnormal returns for each event estimated from 
an equally-weighted portfolio of sample firms. Event 4 has the most negative 
param eter estimate, with an average abnormal return of -0.53 percent. The 
^-statistic reflecting the significance of the average abnormal returns is signifi­
cant at the a  = 0.05 level. This event date is when the Senate defeated a 
proposal to retain a capital gain preference, and likely signalled that the final 
tax bill will not contain a capital gain preference. Consistent with Hypothesis 
1, sample firms experience negative returns on this event. To test for the
Table 3
Portfolio Abnormal Returns (in percent)
Surrounding Key Event Dates^
106 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 3(2) 1994
Event
Number of 
TradingDays
Parameter
Estimate t-Statistic
1 2 0.14 0.39
2 2 0.12 0.48
3 2 -0.11 -0.45
4 2 -0.53 -2.07**
Notes: ^Event 1 is May 2/3,1986. Event 2 is May 7/8, event 3 is May 
29/30, and event 4 is June 24/25.
**Significant at the .05 level using a two-tailed test.
sensitivity of results to the predominance of 1983 IPOs, weighted portfoho 
regression is repeated using IPOs for 1984 and 1985 only, with no significant 
differences in the results.
None of the other three events approach significance at the a  = 0.10 level, 
suggesting there is no evidence of significant changes in expectations for the 
sample of venture-backed firms. At the time of the other events, there is still 
some uncertainty of the status of capital gain repeal, and a Senate amendment 
has been offered to retain the preference.
Thus, the absence of significance for three of the four dates may not be 
surprising given the disapproval that initially greeted the Packwood propos­
als. The market apparentiy adjusted only when the repeal of the capital gain 
preference was certain. To strengthen the link between the Event 4 results 
and the future financing needs of the sample firms, we conducted an 
additional analysis by firm capital structure.
Table 4 presents summary statistics of the abnorm al returns of individ­
ual firms for Event 4. The m edian debt-to-asset ratio obtained from the 
financial statements immediately preceding January 1, 1986, is used to 
classify firms into high versus low debt groups. The m ean abnorm al returns 
reported  in Table 2 indicate systematic differences in the abnorm al returns 
of high and low debt firms. The /^-statistic used to test the significance of 
the difference between the portfolio returns of the high and low debt firms 
indicates that high debt firms have significantly lower abnorm al returns 
than low debt firms, each calculated for Event 4. The W ilcoxon signed-rank 
test also indicates significant negative returns for the high debt firms 
around Event 4.®
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Table 4
Summary Statistics of Individual Abnormal Returns (in percent) 
by Firm Type for Event 4
Quartiles
Firm N Meai^ 0.25 0.50 0.75 Percent Negative
High Debt 90 -0.84 -2.32 -0.72 0.18
Low Debt 91 -0.21 -1.40 -0.27 0.77 56
Notes: “ Firm type is based upon the median debt-to-asset ratio in the financial statements immediately 
preceding January 1,1986.
Mean abnormal return for event 4.
“ ‘significant at the 0.01 level using one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
m . CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPUCATIONS
In this study, we found evidence that venture-backed firms experienced 
negative abnormal returns when the Senate voted to approve a bill repealing 
preferential treatm ent for net capital gains. Venture-backed firms were ex­
pected to be particularly sensitive to changes in the taxation of capital gains, 
because they relied heavily on entrepreneurial risk-taking. In addition to 
finding evidence of an adverse effect for the entire sample of venture-backed 
firms, we found firms with a relatively high ratio of debt to assets to be the 
most adversely affected. This was consistent with the greater need for future 
sources of equity financing for such highly levered firms. The results of this 
study supported the view that investment in particularly risky ventures was 
sensitive to the taxation of capital gains. Sample firms were selected because 
they were expected to be particularly sensitive to the taxation of capital gains. 
Thus, the results may not be generalizable to other forms of risky investment. 
Future research could evaluate the effects of preferential tax treatm ent on 
the returns of other assets.
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1. The exact effect on the progressivity of the system is an empirical issue. See Keifer (1986) 
for an estimate of the effects of the Senate Finance Committee bill.
2. Absolute risk aversion is measured R ^Y)= l f \Y ) /U\Y)y where a = the amount 
invested in the risky asset and Y = the fmal wealth position. Increasing absolute risk 
aversion means that as wealth increases, the amount invested in the risky asset decreases 
(i.e., risk aversion increases with wealth increases). Relative risk aversion is measured as 
Ri{Y) = -U '\Y )Y /U \Y ) , where r= return on the risk-free asset. Increasing relative risk 
aversion means that as wealth increases, the proportion of wealth held in the risky asset 
decreases.
3. The difficulty in securing financing from organized venture financiers suggests a strong 
demand for other sources of financing. Even if a mzyority of organized flmds are 
comprised of tax-exempt investors, taxable investors are expected to be a significant 
source of funds for projects not approved by the organized funds.
4. For example, the firm can issue interest-bearing convertible debentures that provide an 
income stream to the capital provider with the opportunity to later acquire an equity 
interest in the firm. Alternatively, venture capitalists might fund firms that are capable 
of producing sufficient current cash flow to pay dividends on the preferred stock. 
Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson (1990) and Collins and Shackelford (1991) provide 
evidence of capital structure responses to tax law changes.
5. Scholes and Wolfson (1992) note that there was considerable doubt in early 1986 
regarding the fate of specific provisions of TRA. Similarly, Tax Notes (1986) reported 
that the status of compromise legislation was “fragile” unless Senate Finance Committee 
Chairman Packwood and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Rostenkowski 
could agree how to raise corporate taxes to ensure revenue neutrality in the compromise 
plan. This suggested more narrow **event windows” than would be typical for a tax act, 
and assisted in mitigating the effects of non-tax variables in interpreting research results.
6. Once again, no differences were found when the sample was limited to 1984 and 1985 
IPO firms.
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